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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The authority of government agencies to access the electronic data of platforms or private 
electronic system organizers (ESOs) has been a widely discussed topic among international 
experts due to its various practices across the world. Indonesia stipulates provisions on this 
issue through the Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MOCI) Regulation No. 5/2020 
on Electronic System Organizers (ESOs) in the Private Sector. Reflecting from the opinions 
from international scholars and experiences of other countries this paper provides several 
recommendations to improve the substance of the regulation. From the legal aspect, a review 
and appeal mechanism by an independent board and a more robust legal basis are needed to 
ensure public’s political participation. Furthermore, it is ideal that the Law on Personal Data 
Protection is signed and issued before the access authority by government agencies can work 
properly. In the current situation, MOCI should serve as a governing body and privacy safeguard 
to ensure that accesses by ministries and government agencies for supervision purposes are in 
accordance with the principles of personal data protection. This paper concludes that access to 
ESO’s system might not be the best practice, and therefore should be taken as a last resort after 
all mitigation actions on information security have been carried out. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Ministry of Communication and Informatics (MOCI) Regulation No. 5/2020 on Electronic 
System Organizers (ESOs) in the Private Sector, that is set to come into effect in mid-May 2021, 
brings a significant change to the governance of access to ESOs’ data and systems. Article 21 of 
the regulation states that private ESOs are required to provide access to their Electronic Systems 
and/or Electronic Data to (a) ministries or government agencies for supervision purposes in 
accordance with laws and regulations, and (b) law enforcement authorities for law enforcement 
purposes in accordance with laws and regulations. 
Article 3 (4) point (i) obliges all private ESOs to register and provide a statement letter guaranteeing 
access to their systems and data, for law enforcement and supervision purposes in accordance 
with the relevant laws and regulations. 
On the one hand, provisions on the governance of access to data and system in the MOCI 
Regulation No. 5/2020 can serve as the guidelines and standard reference for the ministries/
government agencies and law enforcement authorities to exercise their authority and request for 
access to ESOs’ data and systems. In this case, MOCI can play a role as a governing and advisory 
body to ensure that ministries and law enforcement authorities can exercise their power with 
careful consideration to personal data protection and due process of law. 
On the other hand, access to ESOs’ data and systems is a sensitive issue 
because it is related to means of coercion (dwang middelen) that might 
potentially infringe human rights protection and individual freedom. It also 
has a strong correlation with the protection of personal data and trade secrets 
(including relevant intellectual property rights such as copyrights). If it is not 
exercised carefully, access to systems can potentially cause a security lapse 
that disrupts the ESOs’ information security system posture. These issues 
are public interest and should be protected. 
The MOCI Regulation No.5/2020 essentially addresses these fundamental issues. For 
example, regarding access to data, the regulation requires an assessment on its significance, 
proportionality, and legality. Additionally, the scope and type of system or electronic data that will 
be accessed must be explicitly stated. The access can be used only for purposes stated in the 
request. In terms of access authorization, Article 30 stipulates that there are several components 
that must be protected, such as the integrity, availability, and confidentiality of the Electronic 
Data; reliability and security of the Electronic System and related Personal Data.
Nevertheless, further in-depth analysis is needed to assess whether the MOCI Regulation No. 
5/2020 has accommodated various key elements to safeguard the general principles of human 
rights, intellectual property rights, and personal data protection. 
Discussions surrounding this topic are not unique to Indonesia, considering that similar debates 
can also be seen in other countries. In the United States, for example, debates have been going 
around the definition of “meta-data” and “data”, where the access to meta-data only requires a 
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subpoena, whereas access to data requires a court order (Nissenbaum et al., n.d.). There are also 
debates relating to national security interests, in which data authorization access can be given 
with simpler procedures when it pertains to security threats, such as terrorism (Rubinstein et 
al., 2014). 
Amidst these debates, experiences from other countries can be used as references to assess 
the lawfulness and fairness of the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020. Countries such as the United 
States, Brazil, South Korea, China, and India have their own regulations concerning government 
access to data. With the exception of the Golden Shield project in China, these countries have 
specific legislations that are discussed through a political process in the parliament, which 
represents the public’s voice in the policymaking process. References and literature from these 
countries further suggest that government access is generally used in electronic data rather 
than electronic systems. 
Based on this background, the paper attempts to answer these questions:
a. What are the general principles that should be used as the guidelines to access the data and 
systems of digital business actors?
b. Has the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 adopted the existing general principles on data access?
c. What can be learned from the practices of data governance in other countries?
d. How could the business actors respond to the current debates on data governance? 
e. What policies does Indonesia need in the future with regards to data governance?
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THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
PUBLIC INTEREST
The lawfulness of a government agency to access the data of platforms or 
private ESOs have been extensively discussed by experts. The implementation 
guidelines from the Global Network Initiative (GNI)1 mentions that it is not 
sufficient for a technology company to say, “we are just playing by the rules” 
(Global Network Initiative, 2018). Technology companies have the right and 
obligation to carefully assess whether the government request is legitimate 
and whether it complies with the international human rights standards. GNI’s 
guidelines also state that, should a company be asked to provide information 
to a government agency, it has the right and obligation to:
1. Narrowly interpret and implement government demands that appear to be violating 
personal data protection.
2. Seek clarification or modification from the authorized officials of demands 
that appear overbroad, unlawful, and inconsistent with the prevailing laws and 
international human rights standards on privacy.
3. Request a clear communication, preferably written, that explains the legal basis 
of the government demands for personal information, including the name of the 
requesting government agency, as well as the name, title, and signature of the 
authorized official.
4. Require the government to adhere to the established domestic legal procedure in 
accessing personal data.
5. Adopt policies and procedures to respond to instances where the government fails 
to adhere to the established legal procedures. Such policies and procedures should 
include the consideration of the rationale behind the objection of the government 
demands. 
6. Narrowly interpret the government authority to access personal data.
7. Challenge the government in domestic courts or seek assistance from relevant 
authorities, international human rights bodies, or non-governmental organizations 
when faced with government demands that appear inconsistent with domestic 
laws or procedures or the international human rights standards on personal data 
protection (Global Network Initiative, 2018, pp. 8–9).
1 The Global Network Initiative is a multi-stakeholder collaboration of companies, human rights activists, investors, and other 
stakeholders that ensures that technology companies comply to human rights principles, personal data protection, and freedom of 
expression, especially related to access to data and content blocking. See https://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/.  
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Nico van Eijk, professor of Media and Telecommunications Law and the Director of the Institute 
for Information Law (IViR, Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam) identified seven general 
principles to ensure the oversight and check-and-balances over access to data by the government 
as follows (van Eijk, 2017):
1. Oversight should be comprehensive in three respects: (a) the government (executive 
branch), legislative, judiciary, and specialized commission should all play a role in 
the supervisory process, (b) Supervision should be done prior, ongoing, and after 
the fact has been obtained, and (c) the mandate of the oversight bodies should 
include the review on the lawfulness and effectiveness of the access request.
2. The supervision should include all stages of the data cycle, namely data collection, 
storage, querying, and analysis.
3. The oversight bodies should be independent from intelligence agencies and the 
government, similar to independent judicial mechanisms. 
4. The oversight can be conducted before the implementation of the access (prior 
oversight) or the combination of prior and after-the-fact oversight by an independent 
specialized commission; there is an oversight function by a parliamentary 
committee; and possibility for individuals to complain before an independent body. 
5. The oversight bodies should be able to declare the actions unlawful and provide for 
redress.
6. The oversight should ensure an opportunity for the reporting and reported parties 
to rebut each other (adversarial).
7. The oversight bodies should have sufficient resources to work effectively.
Other prominent scholars, Jennifer Daskal, professor and the Director of the Tech, Law, 
Security Program from the American University Washington College of Law, and Andrew K. 
Woods from the University of Arizona College of Law proposed several general principles 
to ensure the equality of legal protection of access to data (Daskal & Woods, 2015). These 
principles can be used as guidelines as follows:
1. Independent authorization. An independent body is needed to ensure that an access 
request is based on an appropriate cause, in accordance with the agency’s authority 
based on the existing laws and regulations, and proportional. Such an independent 
body is usually a judiciary body, which issues a court order. The existence of a 
judiciary body can also facilitate complaints or objections in the case of the ESO or 
individuals objecting to the access request. 
2. A cause. There is a strong rationale or factual basis for the access request, such as 
a crime or to supervise a certain activity. This principle prevents the abuse of power 
of the party who requests for access for purposes beyond their authority. 
3. Particularity. The access request should specifically refer to a particular individual, 
account, or device, and describe the type, time frame, and data sought. This principle 
also prevents the abuse of power of the party who requests for access for purposes 
beyond their authority. 
4. Legality. All access requests should have a legal basis in the relevant laws and 
regulations. The legal consideration should be explicitly mentioned in every request. 
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5. Proportionality. Every country should define what actions can prompt an access 
request. For example, for law enforcement purposes, only criminal acts with certain 
threats can prompt the right to access personal data.
6. Notice to the users/owners or data subjects. In line with the principles of personal 
data protection, data subjects should be notified with regards to the access request. 
In certain cases, such as in a criminal investigation process, the notification can be 
delayed until the investigation reaches a particular stage. However, the party who 
requests for the access to data still has the obligation to notify the data subjects. 
7. Guarantee of freedom of expression. An access request to data or systems should 
not be used as an instrument to repress citizens who wish to exercise their rights 
to freedom of expression and opinion. 
8. Data collection minimization. Personal data collection should be limited only to 
personal data related to the cause.
9. Exception in emergency situations. Daskal and Woods (2015) also realized that 
the process and procedure of access requests can be excluded or simplified in an 
emergency situation. Hence, a regulation should categorize what constitutes an 
emergency, such as a situation that potentially jeopardizes one’s safety or life (life-
threatening situation).
10. Transparency. Ministries, government agencies, or law enforcement authorities 
are required to uphold transparency in requesting for data access. There should 
be a mechanism to show the number of access requests, including their types, 
scopes, and other relevant information, such as a periodic annual report from the 
law enforcement authorities or ministries/government agencies, or other forms of 
audit.
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THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MOCI REGULATION 
NO. 5/2020 AND ITS ISSUES
The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 regulates two (2) subjects and two (2) material objects.
From the perspective of the subject, the MOCI Regulation No.5/2020 gives authorization to 
ministries/government agencies (defined as the State Administration Agencies responsible to 
supervise and issue regulations in their sectors), and law enforcement authorities. 
From the perspective of the object accessed, the MOCI Regulation No.5/2020 contains provisions 
on the access to “electronic data” and “electronic system”. The regulation explains that “Electronic 
Data” are “data in electronic form which is not limited to text, sound, image, map, design, photo, 
electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex, telecopy or the like, letter, 
sign, number, access code, symbol, or perforation”. Meanwhile, “Electronic System” is “series of 
electronic procedures and devices that serve to prepare, collect, process, analyze, store, display, 
announce, send, and/or disseminate Electronic Information.”. The difference between the risks of 
access to data and systems are explained in the previous chapter. 
With that as a basis, the comparison matrix of the two subjects and objects of the regulation 
below was developed to allow a more in-depth analysis:
Table 1. 
Comparison Matrix of The Two Subjects and Objects of The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020  
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Source: MOCI Regulation No.5/2020, processed by Author 
From the comparison above, issues found in MOCI Regulation No.5/2020 will be discussed below:
Access to data vis-à-vis confiscation. Access to data can be compared to the electronic 
confiscation of an item. With this analogy, regulations regarding confiscation in Article 1 point 16, 
Article 38 to 46, Article 82(1) and (3) in the context of a pre-trial review, Article 128 to 130, Article 
194, and Article 215 of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code (“KUHAP”) will be discussed 
further.  Confiscation is defined under Article 1 point 16 of the Criminal Procedure Code as: “a 
set of actions done by an investigator to seize or store movable or immovable, tangible or intangible 
assets into their possession for the purpose of authentication in an investigation, prosecution, and 
trial”.
Because confiscation is a means of coercion (dwang middelen) that might violate human rights, 
Article 38 of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code stipulates that confiscation can be carried 
out only by an investigator with an approval from a local district court. However, during an 
emergency, the confiscations can take place first, and the investigator has the obligation to report 
it afterwards to the head of the district court to obtain his approval.
The internal regulation of the Indonesian National Police stipulates that a confiscation can be 
carried out without an approval letter or warrant from the head of a district court, but this only 
applies to movable assets. For cases of apprehension in flagrante delicto, an approval/special 
approval letter and confiscations warrant from the chairman of a district court are also not 
required. However, the confiscations can be carried out only for items and equipment that are 
allegedly used in criminal offences or other items that serve as a proof. 
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With this comparison, the difference between access to system vis-à-vis confiscation can be 
seen. The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 divides data into two types: those that require a letter 
of determination from the district court and those that do not. For communication contents in 
particular, a letter of determination from the district court is required. Meanwhile, the Indonesian 
Criminal Procedure Code regulated that the exception of court is determined from its element 
of urgency, rather than the type of confiscated assets. The provisions in the Criminal Procedure 
Code are considered more in line with human rights principles compared to those of the MOCI 
Regulation No. 5/2020. 
With this comparison, the difference between access to system vis-à-vis 
confiscation can be seen. The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 divides data into 
two types: those that require a letter of determination from the district court 
and those that do not. For communication contents in particular, a letter of 
determination from the district court is required. Meanwhile, the Indonesian 
Criminal Procedure Code regulated that the exception of court is determined 
from its element of urgency, rather than the type of confiscated assets. The 
provisions in the Criminal Procedure Code are considered more in line with 
human rights principles compared to those of the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020. 
Access to system vis-à-vis search. Access to systems can be compared to a search, but in this 
context, the law enforcer authority enters the “office/house” of the ESOs. The office/house is 
the electronic system of the ESOs. With this analogy, the regulation concerning confiscations in 
Article 33 of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, which states that a warrant from the head 
of the local district court can prompt a search as required, can be further studied. In addition, 
two witnesses must be present in each instance of entry to a house, if the suspect or owner has 
given their consent, and must be witnessed by the village head or head of the neighborhood, 
if the suspect or owner has refused or is not present. In principle, a search can be carried out 
with a warrant from the head of the local district court. This requirement aims to ensure the 
protection of human rights over their house. It also prevents the search from being carried out 
by the investigator without limitation and supervision. 
Moreover, Article 34 of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code stipulates about a search in an 
urgent situation, stating that “in urgent and compelling circumstances, where an investigator must 
act immediately and cannot possibly first ask for a warrant, without detracting from the provision of 
Article 33 (5), the investigator can carry out a search in limited areas. In this case, the investigator 
shall not be allowed to examine or seize letters, books, and other documents which are not related 
with the offense concerned or are presumed to have been used in committing said offense and for 
which purpose he shall be obliged to report immediately to the chairman of the local district court to 
obtain his approval”.
The explanation in Article 34 (1) of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code states that “urgent” 
and compelling circumstances are instances where the searched place is suspected to be 
occupied by a suspected or accused criminal who might escape or repeat an offense, or there 
might be destruction or transfer of suspected items, and a warrant from the district court is not 
possible to be obtained properly and in a timely manner.
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With this analogy, we can see the difference between access to system vis-à-vis search. Access to 
systems by ministries/government agencies does not require a decision from the district court. 
This is different from the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code that requires a decision from the 
court to guarantee human rights, with the exception of certain urgent situations.
With this analogy, we can see the difference between access to system 
vis-à-vis search. Access to systems by ministries/government agencies 
does not require a decision from the district court. This is different from 
the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code that requires a decision from 
the court to guarantee human rights, with the exception of certain urgent 
situations.
Access to systems. Discussions about access to electronic systems are uncommon, both in 
theoretical debates and its practices in other countries. Access to systems is an unconventional 
practice due to its high information security risks that might disrupt the users of the system, 
including the public (Rubinstein et al., 2014).
The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 does not clearly delineate the objectives of access to systems 
and in what way access to electronic systems is necessary. If the final objective is to gain access 
to data, access to electronic systems shall be taken as a final resort when the government has 
failed to obtain the accessed data. 
Although similar, access to data and access to systems have different implications. Access 
to systems poses high information security risks, especially if it is not accompanied with an 
access control and appropriate operational security measures (OECD, 2019). The ISO/SNI 27001 
Standard of Information Security Management Systems (SMPI), as adopted by the National Cyber 
and Crypto Agency, regulates the access control and operational security to ensure that access to 
electronic systems is carried out in accordance with the universal principles of the SMPI. Below 
are several points in the Standard that are relevant to access to system:
Table 2. 
Points in The Information Security Management System (SMPI) Which are Related to The 
Access to System
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Source: ISO/SNI 27001 standard on Information Security Management System (SMPI).
The standards in Annex A9 and A12 show that access to systems has high security risks. There is 
a probability of unauthorized access, which can happen due to a hacking, identity fraud, or shared 
login practice between the personnel within the ministries or agencies (OECD, 2019). Such an 
incident significantly increases the security risks for ESOs. Moreover, from the operational 
viewpoint, there are also several actions that undermine the security, such as copying or deleting 
files and folders, both intentionally and unintentionally. 
Hence, in addition to complying with the general principles 
of granting access, both ESO’s system and authorities from 
ministries/government agencies who access the system should 
adhere to the principles of information security, at least those 
stipulated in the ISO/SNI 27001 Standard. In practical terms, 
the consequences should be further studied, such as through 
an initial audit of the law enforcement authorities or ministries/
government agencies who wish to access the system of an ESO, 
that is to ensure that the system and the access per se do not 
conflict with the best practices of information security. 
Access by law enforcement authorities vs. access by ministries 
or government agencies. Unlike the provisions on access to data/
system by law enforcement authorities that have comparisons 
from the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code, access to data/
system by ministries or government agencies do not have 
uniform guidelines. Moreover, in international best practices, except for financial, taxation, and 
state intelligence/security sectors, government agencies are rarely given the authority to access 
data or systems of ESOs (OECD, 2019). The provisions on access by ministries or government 
agencies in the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 are actually based on Government Regulation (GR) 
No. 71 of 2019 on Implementation of Electronic Systems and Transaction. 
Article 21 of GR 71 states that “Private Electronic System Organizers shall give access to 
Electronic System and Data for supervision and law enforcement purposes in accordance with 
laws and regulations”. In this context, it means that the ministries or government agencies’ needs 
for data or systems are a part of the supervision of the relevant ESO. However, Article 35 of GR 71 
states that “provisions on the supervision of Electronic System in certain sectors shall be made 
Hence, in addition to complying with the 
general principles of granting access, 
both ESO’s system and authorities from 
ministries/government agencies who access 
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by relevant Ministries or Government Agencies following a coordination with the Minister”.  When 
the provisions regarding supervision are formulated by each ministry or government agency, 
the existence of articles on access to data and/or system by ministries/government agencies 
under the MOCI Regulation No.5/2020 can be legally debated. Considering this, there is actually 
no delegation of authority from GR 71 to the MOCI to further regulate access to data or systems 
by ministries or government agencies. 
The approach in Article 35 of GR 71 that leaves the matter to each ministry or government 
agency is seen as in line with the current practices in Indonesia or overseas, in which access 
by a ministry or government agency is usually based on the authority embedded to the Laws 
(the formulation of which has undergone a political process through the representatives in the 
House of Representatives), to accommodate public participation. Regarding this, sectors that 
generally need access to data are taxation, financial, and state security or intelligence sectors. In 
Indonesia, these sectors already have a robust legal basis equivalent to a Law that becomes the 
basis for data collection for each sector’s purposes. For example:
• Directorate General of Taxes, for tax audit. This authority is in accordance with Law 
No. 6/1983 on General Provisions and Tax Procedures as amended several times, 
most recently by the Job Creation Act.
• Financial Services Authority (OJK) and Bank Indonesia, either for licensing supervision/
inspection or financial system supervision purposes in order to assess systemic 
risks and conduct an inspection to such risks. This authority is in line with the 
Laws on Bank Indonesia and Financial Services Authority, as well as relevant Bank 
Indonesia Regulations (PBI) and Financial Services Authority Regulations (POJK).
• State Intelligence Agency, for activities that threaten national interests and security, 
which are related to ideology, economy, social, culture, defense and security, and 
other public sectors, such as food, energy, natural resource, and environment; 
and/or terrorism, separatism, espionage, and sabotage activities that jeopardize 
the national safety, security, and sovereignty, including those undergoing a legal 
process based on the Law No. 17/2011 on State Intelligence.
Beyond these three sectors, Indonesia has a precedence in the online transportation sector 
to give the government access to data in the form of digital dashboards. Under the Minister 
of Transportation Regulation No. 118/2018 concerning the Implementation of Special Rental 
Transportation, transportation application companies have the obligation to develop and provide 
access to their digital dashboards that contain:
a. the name of the company, person in charge, and address of the Application Company;
b. data of all Special Rental Transportation company partners;
c. data of all vehicles and drivers; 
d. service operational monitoring access in the form of order transaction data through 
the application, including the origins and destinations of the trips and the tariffs; 
and, 
e. customer service in the forms of the Application Company’s telephone and electronic 
mails.
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The provisions of data access through digital dashboards in the Minister of Transportation 
Regulation No. 118/2018 are sufficiently detailed and equivalent to a tax audit or inspection in the 
financial sector. Moreover, the requested data are linked to the identity of the drivers and order 
transactions, which are related to various personal data protection and data that are considered 
trade secrets. If not managed well, such data might be potentially misused for an unhealthy 
business competition, such as to see the competitors’ penetration in different regions across 
Indonesia. The problem is that provisions on digital dashboards are not based on an explicit legal 
basis in Law No. 22/2009 on Road Traffic and Transportation. The MOTr Regulation No. 118/2018 
does not even refer to this Law. 
Other than the three general sectors and one special sector of transportation application in 
Indonesia, access requests to data by ministries or government agencies are generally related 
to license inspection. Ministries or government agencies can request for additional documents or 
conduct a field inspection to ensure the compliance of a business license. 
With a wide array of access typologies by ministries/government agencies for supervision 
purposes, in order to ensure that the current practices work well and to prevent multi-
interpretation of authority, as well as to adhere to the spirit of Article 35 of GR 71, the Ministry 
of Communication and Informatics in general, and the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 in particular, 
should be treated as the instruments that advise and ensure that every access request from 
ministries/government agencies is in line with the principles of personal data protection, in 
addition to the specific provisions in the respective sector.
The Ministry of Communication and Informatics in general, and 
the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 in particular, should be treated as 
the instruments that advise and ensure that every access request 
from ministries/government agencies is in line with the principles 
of personal data protection, in addition to the specific provisions in 
the respective sector.
When the MOCI and the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 are placed as the instruments of advisory 
and harmonization, the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 should not create a new legal norm. Rather, 
it should be used as a technical guide to regulate the relationship and coordination between the 
agencies, such as, first, the relationship between the MOCI and law enforcement authorities. In this 
case, the MOCI can act as a privacy safeguard to ensure secure access from the law enforcement 
authorities. Second, the relationship between the MOCI and supervising 
ministries/government agencies. In this case, the MOCI can also act as a privacy 
safeguard and accordingly standardize the procedures of access rights of the 
institutions that are given such an authority based on the prevailing sectoral 
Law. Third, the relationship between the MOCI and civil servant investigators 
(PPNS). Civil servant investigators have a unique position because they work 
based on the sectoral Law, but still maintain coordination with the police. With a 
similar structure, the MOCI can become a coordination axis for the civil servant 
investigators to access data and electronic systems.
When the MOCI and the 
MOCI Regulation No. 
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Review of the substance and formality of the access request. Even if a complete set of 
regulations on access rights to data or systems can be developed, there will be many debates 
and interpretations regarding the authorization access of the ministries, government agencies, 
or law enforcement authorities. This is normal, considering that electronic data or systems are 
the biggest assets of an ESO which has a complex dimension of confidentiality and intellectual 
property (Accenture, 2016). If we compare access to data and system to a confiscation and 
search, in order to support due process and checks and balances, every right to access needs 
to be complemented with a mechanism to file an objection or complaint as is with a pre-trial 
review in the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code. Based on Article 77 point (a) of the Indonesian 
Criminal Procedure Code, a pre-trial review is the authority of the district court to examine and 
decide the legality or illegality of an arrest, detention, termination of investigation, or termination 
of prosecution. The Constitutional Court has given an additional authority to the pre-trial review 
in the Constitutional Decree No. 21/PUU-XII/2014, so that it has the authority to examine and 
decide the legality or illegality of an arrest, search, or seizure.
The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020, in this case, does not include an appeal mechanism to review 
whether:
a. The basis of authority of ministries/government agencies or law enforcement authorities 
is appropriate.
b. The objectives, targets, and purposes of the ministries/government agencies or law 
enforcement authorities are appropriate.
c. The type of requested access is relevant with the basis of authority, objectives, and targets.
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SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF COMPARISON IN OTHER 
COUNTRIES AND THE ROLES OF BUSINESS 
ACTORS
Stored Communication Act (SCA), Personal Data Protection, 
and The Case of Microsoft
In the United States, the protection of the right to privacy is stipulated in the fourth Amendment 
of the United States’ Constitution, and further regulated under the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act (ECPA) (Department of Justice, n.d.). The amendment of ECPA in 1986 introduced a 
new regulation concerning the Stored Communication Act (SCA) that functions as a lex specialis. 
The SCA limits the government actions to access data related to the users’ information. For all 
inspection cases, including civil and state administrative lawsuits, the government agencies 
require a subpoena from the court to obtain information about the users’ registration and IP 
address data (Schwartz Hannum PC, 2015). A subpoena is a request that can be submitted by 
anyone (individual, private entity, or government agency) to gain access to the opposing party’s 
information. 
Meanwhile, for criminal offenses in particular, a court document that is more substantial than 
a subpoena is required (Turner, 2016). The SCA states that, in order to obtain non-content data, 
a court-issued order is required. Non-content information includes the destination address, 
sender, CC/BCC, or timestamp of an electronic mail. For content information of an electronic 
mail, a search warrant is required, which needs a greater burden of proof from the investigator 
or prosecutor in the form of a “probable cause”, that is to prove the justification for the requested 
content.
For example, Google explicitly states their compliance to the ECPA and SCA on their information 
request page (Google, n.d.). On a similar page, Facebook also wrote a similar statement (Facebook, 
n.d.):
“We disclose account records solely in accordance with our terms of service and applicable 
law, including the United States Federal Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 USC sections 
2701-2712. Under US law:
• A valid subpoena issued in connection with an official criminal investigation is required 
to compel the disclosure of basic subscriber records (defined in 18 USC section 
2703(c)(2)), which may include: name, length of service, credit card information, email 
address(es) and a recent login/logout IP address(es), if available.
• A court order issued under 18 USC section 2703(d) is required to compel the disclosure 
of certain records or other information pertaining to the account, not including contents 
of communications, which may include message headers and IP addresses, in addition 
to the basic subscriber records identified above.
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• A search warrant issued under the procedures described in the United States Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure or equivalent local warrant procedures upon presentation 
of a probable cause is required to compel the disclosure of the stored contents of any 
account, which may include messages, photos, videos, Timeline posts and location 
information.”
From the practice in the United States, we can understand that every access request requires 
an approval/stipulation from the court, except that the burden of proof for certain information 
is considered less substantial, requiring a subpoena and, in some cases, a search warrant to 
scrutinize whether there is a probable cause. 
It should be noted that the SCA does not differentiate between access by law enforcement 
authorities and access by ministries or government agencies. This is because every inspection 
or supervision purpose from ministries or government agencies is administered through a legal 
avenue, be it in the context of civil, administrative, or criminal courts. This is different from the 
legal system in Indonesia, which allows for a legal investigation without a court proceeding, even 
though it is possible for the objecting party to file a civil or administrative lawsuit in the event of 
them objecting to the investigation process. 
Despite having detailed stipulations on access to data, the SCA is still deemed incomplete, 
particularly in the aspect of personal data protection. The SCA does not regulate the obligation 
to give notice to the users when a technology company receives a request from law enforcement 
authorities. 
One case that is quite interesting is the case of Microsoft Corporation v. US (2016), in which 
Microsoft filed for a court ruling to the United States District Court in Seattle, Washington 
(Columbia University Global Freedom of Expression, 2016). The object of dispute is the SCA of 
1986, with Microsoft stating that the secrecy order from the Department of Justice (DoJ) had 
prevented them from providing their users with the search warrant from the public prosecutor 
of the DoJ. According to Microsoft, the secrecy order is against their obligation to protect their 
users’ privacy. This case started in April 2016, and Microsoft in their lawsuit was supported 
by companies alike, such as Amazon, Apple, Google, Dropbox, and Salesforce. In October 2017, 
Microsoft revoked this lawsuit after the DoJ decided to change their policy regarding notification 
to the users or personal data subjects. Despite no amendments in the laws, the new policy of the 
Department of Justice “changes the regulation concerning data requests related to notification to 
the Internet users about the government agencies that access their information” and mandates 
a time restriction if a secrecy order needs to be issued.
In the efforts to file an appeal against the regulations in the SCA, Microsoft believes that provisions 
in the SCA have yet to accommodate the business needs. To ensure that trust is still maintained 
between a technology company and its users, Microsoft proposed three additional principles to 
be used as a reference. 
First, transparency, where the users have the rights to know when the government requests 
for access rights to their records or e-mail communication contents. Second, digital neutrality. 
Only because data is in an electronic form or stored on cloud, does not mean that the protection 
is weaker. The principles of legal protection should still be applicable regardless of the type of 
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technology used. Third, justification. Although there is a justification to classify the access from 
the users, it should be adjusted to the needs of purposes of the running investigation case. If the 
government is not able to give an appropriate justification, the company like Microsoft has the 
obligation to notify about the access to their users (Smith, 2016).
Since Microsoft’s lawsuit, the public prosecutors from the DoJ have changed their practices to 
comply with the general principles of personal data protection. 
Examples of Practices in Other Countries
The experiences of other countries across the world show that government access to electronic 
data is common. However, these examples show that there are similarities in the approach used, 
in that access to data is always based on a legislation equivalent to a Law.
In South Korea, for example, government access to data can be found in various laws and 
regulations, especially in the Act on Personal Information Protection of Public Agencies (APIPPA), 
which was amended and combined with the Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) and 
Telecommunications Business Act (TBA) in 2011. Besides PIPA and TBA, they also have other 
laws, including the Credit Information Act, Communication Privacy Act, the Real Name Finance 
Act, and Act on Use and Protection of DNA Identification Information (DNA Identification Act), 
which regulate data seizure through court orders or other means. In relation to transactional 
data, the Communication Privacy Act requires law enforcement authorities to give the subject 
a written notice within 30 days after obtaining records for investigation purposes (Jong, 2017).
The TBA contains details about data that are provided by telecommunication providers to fulfill 
the communication data request from the court, attorney, or the head of intelligence agency 
to be used in trials, criminal investigations, or for other national security purposes. Such data 
include the users’ name, phone number, identification code used to identify the legitimate users 
of the communication network, and the beginning and end dates of subscription. In relation to 
anti-terrorism, to have access to contents on communication, trip information, and financial 
information, the National Intelligence Agency of South Korea can submit a request to Internet 
Service Providers (ISP) for contact, location, and other relevant personal information about an 
alleged terrorist without a court order.
One of the examples of access to data for a regulator supervision purpose is the access to 
personal information about copyright violators for the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism. 
To protect copyrights, South Korea’s Copyright Act grants the minister the authority to demand 
ISPs to remove or stop the transmission of illegal reproductions or suspend the violator’s account 
from online services for a limited period of time. Furthermore, based on the request from the 
copyright holder to collect data for prosecution, the minister can ask for the ISP to provide the 
list of people who allegedly possess copies or send illegal reproductions.
In India, provisions on access to data for law enforcement purposes can be found in Section 91 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPc) (Abraham, 2017). In addition, under the Reserve 
Bank Act, in order for the government to be able to access financial documents, they must 
request for an access to the Central Bank of India or obtain a court order and ask for an access 
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to the bank’s branch office directly. To secure the access, the provisions of the Bankers Book 
Evidence Act apply to all information or documents stored by the system provider. The Securities 
and Exchange Board of India or SEBI also has wide access to the data of the private sector and is 
given the same authority as the court, including the obligation to open a new account and other 
documents.
The Information Technology Act (ITA) of 2008 gives the authority to the state security agency to 
access the information of users held by the private sector for investigation purposes (Abraham, 
2017). In the “Data Protection” and “Reasonable Security Practices and Procedures and Sensitive 
Personal Data or Information” section, government access is widely allowed, meaning that (a) the 
security agency has no obligation to obtain an authorization prior to accessing the information; 
(b) the security agency is allowed to access the information of any government agencies; (c) the 
security agency is allowed to access all types of “sensitive data or personal information”, and (d) 
the regulation allows the data to be used for general and public purposes. 
In 2014, Brazil issued the Marco Civil da Internet to regulate Internet use (Magrani, 2017). This law 
serves as a regulation on law enforcer authority access to personal data, communication contents, 
users’ identity information (IP addresses), and registration data from telecommunication and 
online providers. Regarding its confidentiality, financial data can only be obtained using a court 
order when it is needed for criminal investigation purposes. This law allows the Brazil Revenue 
Service (BRS) to request and obtain financial data directly from the financial agency without a 
judicial authorization.
In his paper, Magrani (2017) created a typology of authorizations required to gain access to data:
Table 3.
Typology of Authorizations Required to Gain Access to Data.
The Type of Data/ 
Authorization Required to 
Access The Data
Does The Access 
Require A Permit 
from The Court? 
The Regulatory Body Can Access the 
Data Only to Supervise The Activities 
That They Regulate
Communication Content Yes No No
Registration Data No Yes Yes
Communication Metadata Yes No No
Non-communication;




In China, the State Security Law of 1993 grants the state security organization the authority 
to access any information or data held by anyone in China (Wang, 2017). Article 28 of the Law 
on Guarding State Secrets (2010 Revision) also states that “Operators and service providers 
of the Internet or any other public information network shall cooperate with the public 
security organization, the national security organization, and prosecutorial organization in the 
investigation of secret data leakage cases” (Wang, 2017).
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One of the biggest projects in China is the Golden Shield project, which is led by the Ministry 
of Public Security (MPS) and other 11 agencies, including the State Taxation Administration, 
General Administration of Customs, Central Bank (PBOC), Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology (MIIT), and other agencies. These agencies become a part of the initiative to develop 
an e-government system. This project and database refer to a framework set by the “Guiding 
Opinion on Construction of E-Government in our Country issued by the State Informatisation 
Leading Group”. One of the databases for the Golden Shield project is the Basic Internet Database, 
which comprises data that have been collected monthly since 2006 from ISPs (Internet Service 
Providers), ICPs (Internet Content Providers), IDCs (Internet Data Centers), and e-mail services. 
There is no explicit authority given by any laws to build this database, and there are only order 
letters from local police authorities that ask for businesses to submit monthly reports with 
a data collection template created by the MPS. The collected data include all users’ accounts 




Based on the discussions regarding legal and public policy aspects in this paper, it can be 
concluded that provisions on access to data/system as regulated under the MOCI Regulation 
No. 5/2020 on Electronic System Organizers (ESOs) in the Private Sector are subject to dynamic 
debates, not only in Indonesia but in other countries across the world. On one 
hand, there is a legitimate need from government agencies to access the data 
of ESOs or digital platforms. On the other hand, basic principles that become 
the basis of such an access are required to ensure that human rights and 
personal data protection are well-protected.
MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 essentially discusses some of these principles. 
For example, it states that there is a need for assessment of the supervision 
purposes, proportionality, and legality, and that the scope or type of electronic 
data that are going to be accessed should be described explicitly. Access can 
only be used for purposes as written in the request. Moreover, the principles 
of personal data protection and information security are also mentioned 
explicitly. 
Nevertheless, more detailed principal and operational provisions are needed to ensure the 
protection of human rights and users’ personal data. With that as a rationale, this paper suggests 
several recommendations as follows. 
The need for improvements to ensure the due process of 
law, especially in these aspects:
a. Legality: access to data and electronic systems is related to the basic principles of human 
rights, personal data protection, and ESOs’ trade secret protection. Therefore, regulations 
on these areas should be made at the Law level. Regulation at the Law level allows for 
a discussion space by involving the representatives at the parliament. Reflecting from 
the experiences of South Korea, India, and Brazil, although these countries use different 
approaches, they have similarities in terms of the existence of a legal basis at the Law 
level. China’s Golden Shield project is the only program that has no clear legal basis, 
facing objections from the stakeholders. 
b. Authorization or stipulation from judiciary/independent bodies: The MOCI Regulation No. 
5/2020 differentiates between data that require a court determination letter and those 
that do not. This is not in line with the spirit of the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Code 
that requires a court determination letter for a confiscation and search, with the exception 
of urgent instances. The regulation should adopt this spirit, in which all accesses require a 
stipulation from the court or other independent bodies, except for certain matters that are 
described specifically in the Law. 
On one hand, there is 
a legitimate need from 
government agencies to 
access the data of ESOs or 
digital platforms. On the other 
hand, basic principles that 
become the basis of such 
an access are required to 
ensure that human rights and 
personal data protection are 
well-protected.
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c. Review and appeal: As a case develops, it is possible that an ESO challenges or appeals 
against an access request. To ensure the protection of both the users’ human rights and 
ESO’s basic rights, an avenue is needed to review or lodge an appeal through a neutral 
body or forum, such as the court. This is similar to the pre-trial review in the Indonesian 
Criminal Procedure Code, or the review forum on the decision of access rights through an 
administrative trial. 
The MOCI should serve as an advisory body and protector to 
ensure that access by ministries/government agencies are 
in accordance with the principles of personal data protection. 
Considering that there is a plethora of provisions in sectoral Laws, access by ministries/
government agencies can allow for multi-interpretations on government agencies that are 
authorized to access. It is ideal that the Personal Data Protection Law to be issued before the 
access right authority by the government can work properly. In the current situation, the MOCI 
needs to place the MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 as a policy instrument that ensures that every 
access request from ministries/government agencies are in accordance with the principles 
of personal data protection and information security. The MOCI should make the regulation a 
technical rule that addresses the operation of relationship between the MOCI and law enforcement 
authorities and other ministries/government agencies (including the civil servant investigators 
and National Crypto and Cyber Agency), all of which still exercise their practices in the field, 
rather than making it a creator of new norms. 
Access to ESO’s system should be chosen as a last resort 
after other risk mitigation measures have been carried out. 
The MOCI Regulation No. 5/2020 does not describe the objectives of access to systems and in 
what situation it is deemed necessary. Access to electronic systems is not the best practice in 
information security because it opens a new lapse that poses risks for ESOs’ systems. Access 
to system must comply with international regulations, such as the ISO/SNI SMPI, especially in 
relation to access control and security operations. Regarding this, government agencies that wish 
to access the system should comply and be audited using the SMPI Standards before accessing 
an ESO’s system. 
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